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Carbon	capture	and	storage,	or	geosequestration,	 is	an	emerging	
technique	to	address	climate	change	by	reducing	emissions	of	carbon	
dioxide.	New	Zealand	 law	does	not	 presently	 provide	 for	 carbon	
capture	and	storage.	The	Crown	Minerals	Act	1991	and	the	Resource	
Management	Act	1991	do	not	make	it	possible.	Canada	and	Australia	
offer	useful	comparisons,	as,	to	a	lesser	extent,	do	the	European	Union	
and	the	United	States.	The	comparisons	assist	in	an	analysis	of	the	main	
issues	involved	in	creating	a	legal	regime	for	New	Zealand:	rights	to	
real	property,	title	or	permits,	relationship	with	oil	and	gas	operations,	
regulation,	liability,	and	relationships	with	other	legislation.
1. INTRODUCTION
Carbon capture and storage, or “CCS”, is a technology for reducing the 
emission of carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse gas (“GHG”) responsible 
for anthropogenic climate change. CCS, also known as geosequestration, is 
therefore a means of slowing the rate of global warming.1 It is an emerging 
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 1 A useful overview of CCS is provided by Simon Shackley and Clair Gough (eds), 
Climate	Change	and	its	Storage:	An	Integrated	Assessment (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006). It 
examines the general context of climate change, geology, engineering, public perception, 
two case studies and a comparison with nuclear power. A legal chapter examines 
international, European and United Kingdom laws, particularly those concerning marine 
and environmental matters. Two other valuable introductions are International Energy 
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technology; projects on a commercial scale are only just appearing. There 
are four stages to CCS: capture, transport, injection, and storage or disposal. 
In capture, carbon dioxide (CO2) is caught or separated at the source of its 
production. The most likely sources are large-scale combustion, especially in 
a coal-fired power station. The capture or separation is a matter of chemical 
engineering, and a number of different processes are under investigation to 
separate CO2 from other gases like ordinary air. Other CO2 production sources 
that may be suitable are natural gas treatment plants (natural gas from the 
Kapuni field in Taranaki is 40 per cent CO2 before treatment) or industrial 
plants like cement and steel works. The transport of CO2 will most likely 
entail dedicated pipelines. Storage, or geosequestration, requires a geological 
formation into which it is possible to inject quantities of CO2, and which will 
prevent the gas from finding its way back to the surface. It therefore requires a 
reservoir element and a seal. Depleted gas reservoirs have such characteristics, 
and may be suitable CCS sites, but deep saline aquifers may play a greater role.
It is the capture and separation stage that presents the greatest technological 
and economic challenges to the implementation of CCS on a large scale. In 
contrast, pipelines and wells, whether used for exploration, extraction, or 
injection, are long-established technologies, proven in extensive use in the 
petroleum industry. (The injection of gases into geological formations is already 
common in many countries for natural gas storage, for enhanced oil recovery, 
and for the disposal of dangerous material such as “sour gas” containing 
hydrogen sulphide.) Similarly, it is geologically possible for natural formations 
to hold large quantities of gases under high pressure without escape to the 
atmosphere. There are numerous examples where formations have retained 
their integrity for millions of years. Further, the risk of leakage declines 
over time; injected CO2 tends rapidly to become more stable, merging with 
subsurface fluids and materials. It is estimated that the fraction of CO2 retained 
in well-chosen and well-managed CCS geological storage sites is very likely to 
exceed 99 per cent over 100 years and is likely to exceed 99 per cent over 1,000 
years.2 However, it is plainly essential to select suitable storage formations, to 
investigate old wells into the formation to prevent leakage, to manage injection 
Agency (“IEA”), CO2	Capture	 and	 Storage:	A	 Key	 Carbon	Abatement	Option (Paris: 
OECD/IEA, 2008) and the report of the Australian House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Science and Innovation, Between	a	Rock	and	a	Hard	Place:	The	Science	of	
Geosequestration (Canberra: Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2007), chapter 
7 of which analyses the legal issues.
 2 B Metz et al (eds), Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special Report, Carbon	
Dioxide	Capture	 and	 Storage (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); also at 
<www.ipcc.ch> 14. “Very likely” is a probability between 90 and 99%; “likely” is one 
between 66 and 99%.
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carefully, and to carry out extensive monitoring and verification for a long 
period.
CCS will come at a price. The International Energy Agency estimates that 
capture and storage from coal-fired power plants will typically cost USD 50 
per tonne of CO2 mitigated, once the technology has matured. Today’s costs 
are about twice as much. The costs at gas-fired power plants will be somewhat 
higher. Total electricity generation costs including CCS are about 75 to 100 per 
cent higher than for conventional steam cycles without CCS, but may reduce 
in the longer term. The calculation of such costs is complicated by the large 
increase in construction costs between 2000 and 2008.3 The emergence of 
CCS on a large scale will plainly depend upon how these costs compare to 
the emergent price put on carbon dioxide emissions by climate change policy 
measures. Price pressure of some kind is a sine	qua	non for CCS to have any 
kind of economic viability.
One must take care not to overstate the role that CCS may play in the 
fight to reduce anthropogenic climate change. On the international level, the 
International Energy Agency (“IEA”) in its examination of the effect of different 
policy scenarios globally thinks that CCS will play a role, but by no means a 
dominant one. It evaluates the differences between the Reference Scenario, 
which is the continuation of existing policies, and the 450 Scenario, which sees 
the introduction of policies likely to stabilise CO2 concentrations at 450 ppm 
in the atmosphere. The 450 Scenario would see a total of $600 billion injected 
into CCS projects from 2010 to 2030.4 CCS plants would be deployed mainly 
after 2020, and by 2030 would satisfy 5.4 per cent of global demand for electric 
power. CCS would play a substantial role in the United States, but a smaller 
one in other parts of the world. A carbon price is necessary to make CCS power 
plants competitive with conventional plants. CCS will become commercial with 
a carbon price and cap-and-trade in the OECD and other major economies from 
2021 on, but investment in CCS will require the support of governments to 
mitigate risks. CCS will make a significant contribution to the decarbonisation 
of electric power production globally by 2030 under the 450 Scenario: 1.1 Gt of 
CO2 reduction, out of 9.3 Gt, i.e. 11.8 per cent. But one must be realistic; that 
contribution comes well after the contributions of demand reduction (mostly in 
response to energy efficiency measures), renewables and nuclear. CCS is only 
one part of the overall picture.
This need for care not to overstate the role of CCS is all the greater in 
New Zealand. Among developed countries, it has a unique emissions profile, 
in that agricultural emissions contribute 48.2 per cent of total emissions (in 
 3 IEA (2008), supra note 1, at 45, 60–66.
 4 International Energy Agency, World	Energy	Outlook	2009 (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2009) 223–
235, 271–273 for the facts and figures in this paragraph.
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2007), mainly in the form of methane, compared to a more typical 11 per 
cent.5 In addition, gas and coal produce only about 34 per cent of the country’s 
electricity; most is generated from hydro and geothermal energy, although 
the proportion varies according to rainfall.6 There is only one large coal-fired 
power station, at Huntly, and it is aging and less efficient in its use of energy 
than a modern plant would be. There are few other point sources of CO2 large 
enough for commercial-scale CCS. CCS is therefore less of a solution for 
New Zealand than it is for many other countries. CCS will at most be one of 
a number of methods put in place to reduce the nation’s CO2 emissions and 
comply with its obligations under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. On the other hand, CO2 emissions and the use of fossil fuel in 
electricity generation have grown rapidly since 1990, and technological options 
can change quickly. New sources of natural gas, or new uses for the large lignite 
deposits of Southland, could open up new scenarios where CCS is relevant.7
The New Zealand government is co-ordinating research on CCS, primarily 
on the availability of suitable sink formations.8 Possible CCS disposal regions 
include Taranaki, Waikato, Otago and Southland. Taranaki is attractive on 
account of the collocation of sources of CO2, likely sink formations, and a 
higher degree of geological knowledge. The Waikato has deep coal and saline 
aquifer potential. It is not known whether the most promising sites will be found 
onshore or offshore. However, New Zealand is tectonically active, and faulting 
limits the size and stability of potential sink formations, so there is a premium 
on risk assessment techniques.9 The Ministry of Economic Development is 
undertaking a programme of work on the regulatory and legal issues.10 The 
New Zealand government is taking part in international research collaboration, 
in particular the Australia-based Cooperative Research Centre for Greenhouse 
Gas Technologies (“CO2CRC”) and the Global Carbon Capture and Storage 
Institute.
Whatever views one holds on the future role of CCS in New Zealand, there 
 5 New	 Zealand’s	 Greenhouse	 Gas	 Inventory	 1990–2007 (Wellington: Ministry for the 
Environment, ME 928, 2009) 19.
 6 Ministry of Economic Development, Energy	Data	File	2009, 102.
 7 “Get real on clean technologies, Minister tells coal industry”, New	Zealand	Herald, 28 
February 2008, details an exchange between the Minister of Energy and coal company 
Solid Energy on the extent to which CCS should be a priority.
 8 R Funnell, “Overview of New Zealand’s CO2 Storage Options”, in Carbon	Capture	and	
Storage:	Where	are	We	Now?	Proceedings	of	the	International	Carbon	Capture	and	Storage	
Seminar, Wellington, 27 April 2009, at <www.crl.co.nz>.
 9 D Darby, R Funnell and K Higgs, “Geosequestration: its Role in a Sustainable Future 
for New Zealand Gas Resources”, 2006 Petroleum Conference Proceedings, at <www.
crownminerals.govt.nz>.
 10 K Riddell, “Strategy and Regulations for CCS in New Zealand”, in Carbon	Capture	and	
Storage:	Where	are	We	Now?, supra note 8.
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is sure to be agreement that the legal framework should not be an obstacle 
to it. At present it is. The purpose of this article, therefore, is to inquire into 
the requirements for a suitable legal framework for CCS. It does so by a 
comparative analysis that features Canada and Australia, and touches on the 
United States and the European Union. The article examines rights to real 
property, the system of titles or permits for CCS, regulation, the relationship 
of CCS with oil and gas operations, relationships with other legislation, and 
liability. The article does not trace each issue into a fully shaped solution for 
New Zealand law; sometimes the solution is reasonably obvious, but at others it 
needs a good deal more consideration. The focus of the article is on the storage 
or disposal part of the CCS sequence; the earlier stages raise few legal issues 
any different from those concerning any large construction project.
2. THE PRESENT LAW
2.1 New Zealand
New Zealand law does not provide for carbon capture and storage. The Crown 
Minerals Act 1991 (“CMA”) may be the first thing that comes to mind as doing 
so, but in fact it cannot be read to include CCS among the activities that it 
authorises. In order to ascertain the import of the CMA, one works back from 
the offence provision, s 100: every person commits an offence against the Act 
who contravenes s 8. Section 8 says that no person may prospect or explore for, 
or mine, Crown-owned minerals in land unless he or she holds one or another 
kind of permit granted under the Act or is otherwise exempt. One must therefore 
analyse three elements: (i) prospect, explore for, or mine; (ii) Crown-owned; 
and (iii) mineral. For the moment we will focus on the first element.
“Prospecting” is defined in s 2 of the CMA:
Prospecting means any activity undertaken for the purpose of identifying land 
likely to contain exploitable mineral deposits or occurrences; and includes—
(a) Geological, geochemical and geophysical surveys; and
(b) The taking of samples by hand or hand held methods; and
(c) Aerial surveys,—
and to prospect has a corresponding meaning
The core of the definition appears to be “exploitable mineral deposits or 
occurrences”. It is arguable that this could extend to mineral structures in the 
subsoil, which could be exploited by CCS operations. However, one must be 
careful with the use one makes of more open language in a definition like this; 
one must read the statute as a whole.
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“Exploration” means:
… any activity undertaken for the purpose of identifying mineral deposits 
or occurrences and evaluating the feasibility of mining particular deposits or 
occurrences of one or more minerals; and includes any drilling, dredging, or 
excavations (whether surface or sub-surface) that are reasonably necessary to 
determine the nature and size of a mineral deposit or occurrence …
Whether this allows activities directed at establishing the existence of a 
formation capable of storing CO2 is by no means clear. Are such formations 
mineral deposits or occurrences? That strains the language somewhat. The 
evaluation of the feasibility of mining may be a limiting condition within the 
definition; if so, there is no room for CCS operations at all.
“Mining” and “to mine” are defined to mean:
… to take, win, or extract, by whatever means, a mineral existing in its natural 
state in land, or a chemical substance from that mineral, for the purpose of 
obtaining the mineral or chemical substance …
The verbs are take, win, extract, and obtain. There is nothing said about 
depositing, injecting, storing, disposing, or sequestering. It seems clear that 
CCS operations cannot be included within this definition. It is likely that this 
clear definition of “mining” and “to mine” must colour the interpretation of 
“explore” and “prospect”. The statute must be read as a whole, and in particular, 
one would expect a set of carefully crafted definitions in the one section to be 
mutually reinforcing. This would prevent the more elastic readings of general 
words in the definitions of “explore” and “prospect”, and clarify that the Act 
as a whole only authorises mineral activity in the conventional sense. This 
reading back, to construe “explore” and “prospect” in the light of “mining” and 
“mine”, is especially valid when s 32, in protecting the right of a permit holder 
to subsequent permits, shows that the Act is engaged in the management of 
rights at different stages in the one sequence of mineral activity.
The prohibition in s 8 is against prospecting, exploration for, or mining 
Crown-owned minerals without a permit granted under the Act. The permits 
granted under the Act are stated in s 30. The holder of a prospecting permit 
has the right to “prospect”, the holder of an exploration permit has the right to 
“explore”, and the holder of a mining permit the right to “mine”. So the rights 
that can be conferred on permit holders are confined by the definition of the 
three verbs.11 These are the only rights that the Minister can grant; he or she 
 11 Greymouth	 Petroleum	 Holdings	 Ltd	 v	 Todd	 Taranaki	 Ltd, unreported, High Court, 
Wellington, CIV-2004-485-1651, Wild J, 25 July 2006 observed at para 55 that the Act 
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is bound by the legislation. It is unlikely that the Minister can exceed these 
statutory definitions by including more generous rights as permit conditions.12
Section 2 also defines “mining operations” as operations in connection with 
mining, exploring, or prospecting for any Crown-owned mineral, including a 
variety of connected activities. One of those (paragraph (d)) is “[t]he deposit 
or discharge of any mineral, material, debris, tailings, refuse, or wastewater 
produced from or consequent on, any such operations”. The last words of this 
definition rule out the inclusion of CO2 from a combustion source not associated 
with mineral activity. It should also be noted that this definition does not take the 
central place in the permitting regime; the permits are granted for prospecting, 
exploring, and mining as defined.
The necessary conclusion is that permits for CCS operations cannot be 
issued under the CMA. If the definitions of “prospect”, “explore” and “mine” 
do not include CCS operations, then those operations are not prohibited by 
s 8 of the CMA, and are not an offence under s 100. This is an interesting and 
perhaps unexpected consequence, but it does not alter the fact that the CMA 
permitting regime does not include CCS operations.
At this point one can turn to the definition of “petroleum” in the CMA, 
in respect of elements (ii) and (iii) identified above, because petroleum is the 
mineral most likely to be associated with arguments about CCS, and because 
it is declared by s 10 to be Crown-owned notwithstanding any Crown grant, 
certificate of title or other instrument of title. Section 2 says:
Petroleum means—
(a) Any naturally occurring hydrocarbon (other than coal) whether in a 
gaseous, liquid, or solid state; or
(b) Any naturally occurring mixture of hydrocarbons (other than coal) whether 
in a gaseous, liquid, or solid state; or
(c) Any naturally occurring mixture of one or more hydrocarbons (other 
than coal) whether in a gaseous, liquid, or solid state, and one or more 
of the following, namely hydrogen sulphide, nitrogen, helium, or carbon 
dioxide—
and, except in sections 10 and 11, includes any petroleum as so defined which 
has been mined or otherwise recovered from its natural condition, or which has 
manages petroleum exploration and mining by prohibiting those activities except pursuant 
to a permit for a defined area of land. The regulation is primarily of activities, except by 
permit. At para 77 it notes that “mining operations” are defined in an inclusory way, but the 
point is not developed.
 12 Cudgen	 Rutile	 (No	 2)	 Ltd	 v	 Chalk [1975] AC 520 (PC) is the case in point. Section 
105(1)(m) authorises the making of regulations prescribing the duties of permit holders and 
the activities to be carried out under permit, but it cannot authorise regulations that in effect 
amend the definitions that Parliament has chosen to give in s 2.
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been so mined or otherwise recovered but which has been returned to a natural 
reservoir for storage purposes in the same or an adjacent area
Although a court is likely to draw on expert evidence if this comes into dispute, 
there seems to be no room at all for anyone to argue that carbon dioxide is 
one of the hydrocarbons. Nor does there seem to be any room to argue that a 
substance is naturally occurring if it is a product of combustion or the product 
of natural gas treatment and injected in a CCS operation. There is no authorising 
of CCS operations. The reference to storage at the end of the definition is 
tightly confined: what is returned to a reservoir must be petroleum; it must be 
a naturally occurring mixture; it must have been mined or otherwise recovered 
in its natural condition; it must be returned to a reservoir in the same or an 
adjacent area; and, because of the exception of ss 10 and 11, it is still not vested 
in the Crown. Finally, storage is the action of keeping or accumulating a thing 
for future use.13 The purpose of CCS operations is the permanent sequestration 
or disposal of GHGs. The possibility that the sequestration may not be perfect 
over geological time frames does not detract from that. Readiness for retrieval 
is the last thing that is intended. Carbon capture and “storage” is therefore 
something of a misnomer. Overall, these constraints mean that the references 
to storage in the definition of “petroleum” in the Crown Minerals Act do not 
authorise CCS operations.
Let us turn to the Resource Management Act 1991 (“RMA”). Under the 
RMA, no person may discharge any contaminant from any industrial or trade 
premises onto or into land, or into water, unless the discharge is expressly 
allowed by a rule in a regional plan, by a resource consent, or by regulations.14 
Thus under present law CCS injection would require a resource consent from the 
regional council, unless it is named as a permitted activity in the regional plan 
(which is unlikely), or unless it takes place beyond the 12-mile limit, where the 
RMA does not apply. One can imagine an argument that the RMA can facilitate 
CCS operations, relying, in respect of saline aquifers, on its continuation of the 
vesting in the Crown of all waters and rights to waters in their natural state,15 
and relying on the designation procedure to allow a network operator to deal 
with property-based objections. However, the Act would quickly show that 
 13 Concise	Oxford	Dictionary (10th ed, rev 2002), New	Shorter	Oxford	English	Dictionary 
(1993). N Bankes, J Poschwatta and E M Shier, “The Legal Framework for Carbon Capture 
and Storage in Alberta” (2008) 45 Alberta Law Review 585, note that the terms “disposal” 
and “sequestration” are more suitable. However, it is impractical to abandon the general 
usage of the term “carbon capture and storage”.
 14 Section 15. The term contaminant includes greenhouse gases: Genesis	 Power	 Ltd	 v	
Greenpeace	NZ	 Inc [2008] NZRMA 125 (CA) para 15. Section 104E is relevant to the 
discharge of greenhouse gases to air only.
 15 RMA s 354, which brings forward the declaration of water rights made in the Water and 
Soil Conservation Act 1967.
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it was never intended for anything like CCS operations. It provides no rights 
suitable for the exploration and assessment of subsurface structures that may 
take years, nor for storage, disposal, and long-term monitoring after injection. 
Its administration is in the hands of regional councils who have no expertise 
in deep subsurface geology. Again, one finds that CCS sequestration activities 
would have only the most modest authorisation under the present New Zealand 
legislation.
2.2 Canada
Having determined the insufficiency of present New Zealand law for carbon 
capture and storage purposes, we can usefully consider relevant comparisons. 
That offered by Canada is useful because of a comparable legal regime and 
a physical setting, the Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin of the prairie 
provinces and British Columbia, which offers particularly good CCS potential, 
especially in deep saline aquifers. These aquifers can easily accommodate many 
decades and even centuries of storage.16 They underlie large sources of CO2 
such as multiple coal-fired power stations and oil refineries in the Edmonton 
region. The enormous oil sands developments in the Fort McMurray region 
of Alberta are not too distant. The oil sands resources are very large, but the 
extraction and upgrading of oil from them requires a substantial energy input, 
which results in major CO2 emissions.
In Western Canada, CO2 has been successfully sequestered for the purpose 
of enhanced oil recovery (“EOR”) since the 1970s. CO2 is injected into an oil 
field in order to reduce the viscosity of the oil and to increase the amount that 
can be recovered. One such project is at Weyburn, Saskatchewan. The Weyburn-
Midale CO2 Monitoring and Storage Project, launched in 2000, now combines 
EOR with CCS research.
Climate change policymaking in Canada is complicated by the constitutional 
division of powers between the federal and provincial governments. The 
governments of resource-rich provinces are hostile to any federal action on 
climate change that may intrude on their jurisdiction over natural resources 
industries, but the federal government is responsible for international climate 
change negotiations and the consequent responsibilities.17
In 2007 the Canadian federal government issued a policy statement 
Regulatory	Framework	 for	Air	Emissions.18 Building on previous policy 
 16 Ecoenergy Carbon Capture and Storage Task Force, Canada’s	Fossil	Energy	Future:	The	
Way	Forward	on	Carbon	Capture	and	Storage (Report to Minister of Energy, Alberta, and 
the Minister of Natural Resources, Canada, 2008) 12.
 17 See N Bankes and A R Lucas, “Kyoto, Constitutional Law and Alberta’s Proposals” (2004) 
42 Alta L Rev 355.
 18 Minister of Environment, at <www.ec.gc.ca>.
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announcements, it stated a national objective of reducing emissions by 20 
per cent from 2006 levels by 2020, and 60 to 70 per cent by 2050. Emissions 
intensity obligations will be one of the main policies to reach those objectives. 
They will be imposed in key industrial sectors: electricity generation produced 
by combustion; oil and gas (including oil sands, upstream oil and gas, natural 
gas pipelines, and petroleum refining); pulp and paper; iron and steel; iron ore 
pelletising; smelting and refining; cement; lime; potash; and chemicals and 
fertiliser.19 Within those regulated sectors, existing facilities will be required 
to reduce emissions by 18 per cent by 2010 (6 per cent per annum from 2006 
base level) for each unit of production, and thereafter at a continuing rate of 
2 per cent per annum. New facilities (2004 or later) will have a three-year 
grace period before the 2 per cent per annum obligation begins. Regulated 
emitters will be able to comply with these requirements by choosing among 
three different options. Firstly, they can make actual reductions in emissions, 
including by means of CCS. Secondly, they can make contributions to a 
“climate technology fund” that is to be established, at a rate of $15 per tonne 
from 2010–2012, $20 from 2013, and inflation-adjusted thereafter. The extent 
to which a firm can discharge its obligations by fund payments will be capped at 
70 per cent, falling to zero in 2018. Thirdly, they can comply through emissions 
trading. (Offsets were expected to provide tradable credits only for reductions 
from activities outside the industrial air emissions regulations.)20 For emitters 
who took early action to reduce GHG emissions between 1992 and 2006, a one-
time credit for early action will be a fourth option. Equivalency agreements will 
allow the federal scheme to be suspended in favour of a provincial scheme that 
is at least as stringent.21
In March 2008 the federal government produced a set of five additional 
documents elaborating and expanding these proposals for GHG and air 
pollution regulation.22 They contained new detail about cleaner fuel standards, 
co-generation, the programme for credit for early action, and the programme 
for the offset system and other emissions trading. However, what was most 
striking was that CCS was proposed as the benchmark for emissions from new 
electricity generation and new oil sands projects:23
 19 This list of sectors is as refined by Minister of Environment, Regulatory	Framework	 for	
Industrial	Greenhouse	Gas	Emissions, March 2008, 2.
 20 Minister of Environment, Canada, Regulatory	Framework	for	Air	Emissions, 2007, 14.
 21 Equivalency agreements are made under s 10 of the Canadian Environmental Protection 
Act, 1999 (“CEPA”), SC 1999, c 33. Where the federal minister and a provincial govern-
ment have an agreement in force, then the specified CEPA regulations are suspended within 
the signing province.
 22 Environment Canada News Release, “Government Details of Greenhouse Gas Regulatory 
Framework”, 10 March 2008, at <www.ec.gc.ca> with the proposal documents.
 23 Minister of Environment (2008), supra note 19, at 11.
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The government therefore intends to develop targets based on carbon capture 
and storage for upgrader and in-situ facilities in the oil sands sector, and for 
new coal-fired electricity-generating facilities, that begin operation in 2012 or 
later. The targets will apply in 2018. The exact specification of these targets 
will be determined during the development of the proposed regulations. 
Emissions of a regulated facility that are captured and stored will be considered 
as emission reductions. Application of these targets is expected to generate an 
additional 30 Mt in reductions in 2020 beyond those expected from the basic 
regulatory framework.
This put very strong pressure on the proponents of new oil sands projects 
or coal-fired power stations to find a way to bring CCS into operation on a 
commercial scale. In relation to coal, the government stated its intention that 
the regulations “will effectively end the construction of dirty coal-fired plants”24 
and require the coal plants of the future to use clean technologies such as CCS. 
Further emphasis was given to CCS by an option for companies to receive credit 
for pre-certified investments in their own CCS projects, as if they had paid the 
money into the federally administered technology fund.25 These proposals were 
criticised for reliance on emissions intensity rather than absolute reductions 
and an unduly low price on carbon.26 But the offset system is a key part of 
Canadian domestic action on climate change, and is being developed with a 
view to setting up a carbon market in connection with the United States.27
As some Australian and American states have done, some Canadian 
provinces have taken significant climate change measures even though the 
federal government has not. British Columbia has introduced legislation for 
a cap-and-trade system, and has already implemented a carbon tax. Ontario 
is developing a cap-and-trade system. British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario 
and Quebec are all partners in the Western Climate Initiative along with seven 
American states, and Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia are observers.
As for CCS as a particular response to climate change and the need to 
reduce GHG emissions, an advisory task force in 2008 recommended a target 
for Canada for 2015 of bringing three to five CCS projects into operation, to 
sequester 5M tonnes of GHGs per annum. It identified as its second priority 
 24 Minister of Environment, Taking	Action	to	Fight	Climate	Change, March 2008, 3.
 25 Minister of Environment (2008), supra note 19, at 16. CCS was the main focus of the pre-
certified investment option.
 26 M Bramley, Pembina Institute, “Analysis of the Government of Canada’s April 2007 
Greenhouse Gas Policy Announcement”, 28 May 2007, at <www.pembina.org>; N Bankes, 
“The Federal Government’s Climate Change Policy and the Role of Carbon Capture and 
Storage”, 2008, at <www.ablawg.ca>.
 27 Environment Canada, Canada’s	Offset	System	for	Greenhouse	Gases:	Program	Rules	and	
Guidance	for	Project	Proponents	(draft), June 2009.
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(after funding) the need to move quickly to confirm legislation and regulation 
relating to pore space and disposition rights, liability, and increasing the 
transparency of regulatory processes.28 The federal government has allocated 
$650 million for large-scale CCS projects.
Alberta is Canada’s leading province for oil and gas operations. In January 
2008 it announced a new Climate Change Strategy,29 setting an objective of 
reducing emissions of CO2 by 200 megatonnes by 2050, which is one half 
of business-as-usual projections and 14 per cent below 2005 levels, while 
maintaining economic growth. The three main elements are CCS, energy 
conservation and efficiency, and greening energy production. The Specified Gas 
Emitters Regulation30 requires Alberta facilities that emit more than 100,000 
tonnes of GHGs per annum to reduce emissions intensity by 12 per cent. A 
company can comply by reducing its emissions, by purchasing Alberta-based 
credits, or by contributing to the province’s Climate Change and Emissions 
Management Fund. According to the Alberta Strategy, 70 per cent of the 
emissions reduction is to be achieved through CCS. In July 2008 the province 
announced that it would contribute $2 billion to CCS projects, and in February 
2009 introduced legislation for that purpose.31 The Act, five sections long, 
addresses only this aspect of CCS. The province has established the Alberta 
Carbon Capture and Storage Development Council, which produced an interim 
report in October 2008.32 The report indicates an awareness of the legal issues, 
but does little to say how they should be resolved.33
Substantial geological and technical investigations are already under way 
by different groups in Canada. One of the largest is the Wabamun Area CO2 
Sequestration Project at the University of Calgary. That project estimates the 
cost of capture currently ranging between $40 and $120 a tonne, and that of 
sequestration between $3 and $12 a tonne.34 Another is the Alberta Saline 
Aquifer Project, a consortium of oil and pipeline companies. A different group 
is investigating the pipeline to meet the needs of CCS to move CO2 from the 
 28 Ecoenergy Carbon Capture and Storage Task Force (2008), supra note 16, at 23.
 29 Alberta Environment, Alberta’s	2008	Climate	Change	Strategy:	Responsibility	/	Leadership	/	
Action, 2008.
 30 Alta Reg 139/2007, made under the Climate Change and Emissions Management Act, SA 
2003, c 16.7. Also made under that Act is the Specified Gas Reporting Regulation, Alta Reg 
251/2004.
 31 Carbon Capture and Storage Funding Act, SA 2009, c C-2.5.
 32 Alberta Carbon Capture and Storage Development Council, Accelerating	Carbon	Capture	
and	Storage	in	Alberta, October 2008, at <www.energy.gov.ab.ca>.
 33 For a critique, see N Bankes and J Poschwatta, “Comments on the Interim Report of the 
Alberta Carbon Capture and Storage Development Council, Accelerating	Carbon	Capture	
and	Storage	in	Alberta”, 2008, at <www.ablawg.ca>.
 34 “Cutting Emissions Could Sidetrack Carbon Storage”, Financial	Post, 17 January 2009.
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point of capture to storage. There is also interest, as in other countries, in 
biological carbon sinks, land use, land use change, and forestry.35
The leading analysis of the legal issues for CCS in Canada is “The Legal 
Framework for Carbon Capture and Storage in Alberta” by Nigel Bankes, 
Jenette Poschwatta and E Mitchell Shier.36 They point out that in the design 
of law for CCS much can be learned from the law developed for analogous 
operations, including natural gas storage, enhanced oil recovery, and acid gas 
disposal.
2.3 Australia
Just as in Canada, climate change policy in Australia has developed at different 
rates between state governments and the Commonwealth (federal) government. 
A change of Commonwealth government in late 2007 led swiftly to ratification 
of the Kyoto Protocol and a new emphasis on policy development. A national 
emissions trading scheme (“ETS”) is under development as the cornerstone 
of the country’s response.37 Although the enactment of an emissions trading 
scheme has been highly controversial, there has been a much higher degree of 
consensus on the role of carbon capture and storage. It is thought that CCS must 
play a significant part in reductions in emissions of GHGs, especially because of 
the major place that coal occupies in its supply of energy. A White Paper issued 
in December 2008 makes the central role of CCS clear.38
Work on carbon capture and storage has been under way for some years. At 
the national level, the Ministerial Council on Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
established a working group on CCS in 2003. The Council endorsed a set of 
Guiding Principles in November 200539 which have been much discussed 
internationally.40 Internationally, the Australian government took the lead in 
amending the Protocol to the London Dumping Convention in order to authorise 
 35 S A Kennett, “Carbon Sinks and the Kyoto Protocol: Legal and Policy Mechanisms for 
Domestic Implementation” (2003) 21 JERL 252.
 36 N Bankes, J Poschwatta and E M Shier, “The Legal Framework for Carbon Capture and 
Storage in Alberta”, supra note 13.
 37 Generally, see T Bonyhady and P Christoff (eds), Climate	Law	 in	Australia (Annandale: 
Federation Press, 2007).
 38 Commonwealth of Australia, Carbon	 Pollution	 Reduction	 Scheme:	 Australia’s	 Low	
Pollution	Future, December 2008, at <www.climatechange.gov.au>. A good general review 
is J Fahey and R Lyster, “Geosequestration in Australia: Existing and Proposed Regulatory 
Mechanisms” (2007) 4 JEEPL 378, at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120688?>.
 39 Ministerial Council on Mineral and Petroleum Resources, Carbon	Dioxide	Capture	 and	
Geological	Storage:	Australian	Regulatory	Guiding	Principles, 2005, at <www.ret.gov.au>.
 40 N Bankes and J Poschwatta, “Australian Legislation on Carbon Capture and Storage: A 
Canadian Perspective” (Calgary: University of Calgary ISEEE Research Paper, June 2008) 
20–21.
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CCS operations in marine areas.41 With the states it launched the Cooperative 
Research Centre for Greenhouse Gas Technologies. In 2008 it launched the 
Global Carbon Capture and Storage Institute to co-ordinate projects around 
the world, with a proposed budget of $100 million (Australian) per annum. The 
federal and state governments are supporting pilot plants in the Otway Basin in 
Victoria and the Gorgon project in Western Australia.
Within the Commonwealth government, work began in 2006 to produce 
legislation for CCS. In August 2007 a Parliamentary Standing Committee 
report, Between	a	Rock	and	a	Hard	Place, was tabled, making a thorough 
analysis of the issues (including the economics and public perception), and 
generally supporting the departmental work that was under way.42 An “exposure 
draft” of the legislation was released in May 2008. Departmental suggestions 
that it would be skeletal in form were not fulfilled; it came in at a portly 450 
pages.43
The legislation was introduced in May 2008 as the Offshore Petroleum 
Amendment (Greenhouse Gas Storage) Bill 2008. It was an amendment of 
the Offshore Petroleum Act 2006, which was itself wending its way through 
the legislative process.44 In Parliament, there was bipartisan support for 
the Bill, but there were two controversial aspects. The first was long-term 
liability; the Opposition argued that a CCS industry would only be viable if 
the government assumed long-term liability for failures of sequestration. The 
second was the argument that the Bill gave undue primacy to the holders of 
petroleum tenements (licences) in a way that could allow the petroleum industry 
to inhibit the growth of a CCS industry.45 A number of changes were made in 
 41 1996	Protocol	to	the	Convention	on	the	Prevention	of	Marine	Pollution	by	Dumping	Wastes	
and	Other	Matter,	1972, at <www.imo.org>. On the Australian-sponsored amendment that 
was adopted on 2 November 2006 and came into force on 11 February 2007, see Fahey 
and Lyster (2008), supra note 38, at 7. On the Protocol generally and the need to clarify 
the place of CCS, see R Purdy, “Geological Carbon Dioxide Storage and the Law”, in 
S Shackley and C Gough (eds), Carbon	Capture	 and	 its	 Storage (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2006) 87, at 102; International Energy Agency, Legal	Aspects	 of	 Storing	CO2 (OECD/
IEA, 2005); and International Energy Agency, Legal	Aspects	of	Storing	CO2:	Update	and	
Recommendations (OECD/IEA, 2007).
 42 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Science and Innovation, Between	 a	
Rock	 and	a	Hard	Place:	The	 Science	 of	Geosequestration (Canberra: Parliament of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, 2007). Chapter 7 analysed the legal issues.
 43 Allens Arthur Robinson Newsletter, Focus:	Climate	Change, November 2007, 2.
 44 Its progress was slow because it was legislation that represented the Offshore Constitutional 
Settlement, between the Commonwealth, states and Northern Territory, and required state 
legislation to mirror it. In general terms it was a rewrite and update of the Petroleum 
(Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth), the main statute for oil and gas operations offshore.
 45 S Barrymore and A Mathison, “Offshore Petroleum Amendment (Greenhouse Gas Storage) 
Bill 2008 (Cth)” (2008) 27 ARELJ 348; J Fahey and L McMurtrie, “Carbon Capture and 
Storage Bill before Senate”, Mallesons Stephen Jaques Newsletter, October 2008.
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response to these concerns and other parliamentary scrutiny.46 Provisions that 
might have prevented EOR operations were removed. On long-term liability, 
the government moved its position, and in the Senate agreed to amendments 
that would result in the Commonwealth assuming liability for CCS failures 
after site closure and a closure assurance period, and for failures where the 
operator company has ceased to exist. As for the petroleum industry, it did well 
in protecting its interests, as we shall see below. It did not obtain an absolute 
veto of GHG activities, nor did it get a one-off general option to incorporate 
GHG rights into petroleum titles, although companies can get non-competitive 
access to GHG rights in some circumstances. It did not get the ministerial power 
it sought to require GHG operators to negotiate in good faith with petroleum 
companies in certain circumstances. Nor was a power to make regulations for 
third-party access removed.
After these amendments in course of the parliamentary process, the 
legislation was enacted as the Offshore Petroleum Amendment (Greenhouse 
Gas Storage) Act 2008 (Cth) (“GHG Storage Act”), amending the Offshore 
Petroleum Act 2006 and renaming it the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse 
Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) (“OPGGSA”). The GHG Storage Act received 
royal assent on 21 November 2008, and the majority of its provisions came into 
force on 22 November 2008.47
Carbon capture and storage legislation is under development in some states 
as well as at the Commonwealth level. The current situation is as follows:
(i) In Victoria, the Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 
has been enacted commencing 1 January 2010. It is stand-alone 
legislation, but its model is similar to the OPGGSA, the main point 
of difference being that the state government accepted no transfer of 
long-term liability.
(ii) In South Australia, a CCS regime is provided by amendments in 2009 
to the Petroleum and Geothermal Energy Act 2000. The petroleum 
industry expresses itself pleased with the recognition it gives to the 
rights of pre-existing licences.
(iii) The Queensland legislature has enacted the Greenhouse Gas Storage 
Bill 2009. It is different from the Commonwealth Act in that petroleum 
(or mineral) operators cannot secure GHG rights over the area of their 
title on a non-competitive basis; and GHG operators will be able to get 
rights over pre-existing petroleum rights under a very complex regime.
 46 S Barrymore and A Mathison, “Update: Offshore Petroleum Amendment (Greenhouse Gas 
Storage) Bill 2008 (Cth)” (2008) 27 ARELJ 469.
 47 M Gibbs, “Greenhouse Gas Storage in Offshore Waters: Balancing Competing Interests” 
(2009) 28 ARELJ 52.
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(iv) There are no announced plans for onshore legislation in Western 
Australia, Tasmania, New South Wales, or the Northern Territory.
Meredith Gibbs and Phillipa McCormack perceive three patterns in this 
legislation: to amend the petroleum law (Commonwealth and South Australia); 
stand-alone legislation (Victoria and Queensland); and project-specific state 
agreements (Western Australia).48 In Western Australia, the Barrow Island 
Act 2003 (WA) specifically authorises CCS for the Gorgon project, where 
significant amounts of CO2 will be stripped from produced natural gas and will 
be disposed of by geosequestration.
The Australian OPGGSA and state Acts are a major achievement, and 
will undoubtedly influence legislatures addressing CCS beyond the shores 
of Australia. The legislation is the result of a sustained process of policy 
development and law reform. Nonetheless, even the most blasé reader of 
statutes must be impressed — appalled — by the sheer size and detail of the 
OPGGSA. It has 791 sections, and covers 1103 pages. About one third of the 
sections are about CCS, and many more affect CCS and petroleum equally. 
There are particular reasons for this size, in the special legislative history of 
Australian offshore legislation as the result of negotiation between the state 
and Commonwealth governments. To cut down the scope for states to go their 
own way, the titles provisions had to be extremely detailed, even at the price 
of flexibility; and they had to be cast in terms of administrative authorisations 
instead of contractual or proprietary grants of rights.49
2.4 The United States
Although this article focuses on Canada and Australia in its comparisons, we 
can note in passing that some states in the United States have enacted legislation 
to facilitate carbon capture and storage. The Interstate Oil and Gas Compact 
Commission has issued a model statute for CCS, based upon existing state 
laws for natural gas storage — the logical extension, as Fish and Wood put it, 
of a known regulatory programme.50 Wyoming, for example, has declared that 
 48 M Gibbs and P McCormack, “No Consistent Approach to CCS Legislation”, Blake 
Dawson, Greenhouse Update, October 2008. For a detailed tabulation, see R Harvey, 
“Carbon Capture and Storage Legislation” [2008] AMPLA Yearbook 168; and, at a slightly 
earlier stage, Fahey and Lyster (2008), supra note 38.
 49 T Daintith, Discretion	in	the	Administration	of	Offshore	Oil	and	Gas (Melbourne: AMPLA, 
2005) 13 & 175.
 50 J R Fish and T R Wood, “Geologic Carbon Sequestration: Property Rights and Regulation” 
(2008) 54 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute 3-1; Interstate Oil and Gas Compact 
Commission, Storage	of	Carbon	Dioxide	in	Geologic	Structures:	A	Legal	and	Regulatory	
Guide	for	States	and	Provinces (2007).
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the ownership of pore space below the surface is vested in the surface owner, 
although giving protection to existing mineral owners at the same time. There 
are few judicial decisions on matters relating to CCS and the ownership of pore 
space, and most of them will take the issue as a matter of first impression.
2.5 The European Union
The European Union is committed to the deployment of CCS as part of an 
aggressive strategy of reducing GHG emissions. The European Commission 
will require near-zero emissions from coal after 2020.51 In 2009 the EU adopted 
a Directive on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide.52 The Directive 
removes barriers to CCS in existing EU law; it requires new combustion 
plants to be capable of retrofitting with carbon capture technology, although 
it does not require such retrofitting. It controls the selection of CCS storage 
sites through site characterisation, and then provides for storage permits. After 
closure of an injection site, liability under the Emissions Trading Scheme and 
the Environmental Liability Directive can be transferred to the competent public 
authority. However, the legislation of member states will also play a significant 
role.
3. RIGHTS TO REAL PROPERTY
Against that background of the state of CCS legislation in different countries, 
we can turn to consider specific legal issues in turn. The first is property law 
and the ownership of land. The possibility that the owner of an estate in land 
must give consent to carbon capture and storage operations under his or her 
land is a real one, but raises complex legal issues. (One can take it as given that 
operations or installations on the surface of privately owned land will require 
either the consent of the landowner or statutory authority.) The starting point 
in the law of most countries, certainly including New Zealand, Australia and 
Canada, is that rights deriving from the ownership or possession of an estate in 
land are presumed to be capable of exercise on all parts of the land, including 
 51 Generally, see N Bankes and M Roggenkamp, “Legal Aspects of Carbon Capture and 
Storage”, in D Zillman et al (eds), Beyond	the	Carbon	Economy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008) 339.
 52 Directive 2009/31/EC, adopted by the European Council on 6 April 2009.
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upwards and downwards, indefinitely: cuius	est	solum	eius	est	usque	ad	coelum	
et	ad	inferos.53 Windeyer J refers to:54
the elementary principle of the common law that a freeholder … is entitled to 
take from his land anything that is his. Except for those minerals which belong 
to the Crown, the soil and everything naturally contained therein is his.
As with all such generalisations, the real issues lie in the multiple exceptions, 
but this is the general rule from which an exception is to be established.
What rights are held by a mineral owner (the Crown or some private 
person), in relation to the surface owner, will depend upon the interpretation of 
the original grant or instrument of severance, reading words as they were meant 
in the vernacular of the mining world, the commercial world, and landowners, 
at the time of the grant.55 Whether a grant of mineral rights includes a right to 
the spaces left after the minerals have been extracted was a live issue in the 
nineteenth-century courts of England and Scotland. Sometimes it would depend 
on language that indicated the grant of a corporeal interest, such as mines, 
seams, or veins.56 A conveyance of “minerals”, or of land subject to a right to 
work named minerals, will generally give no right to control the space occupied 
or formerly occupied by mineral substances, even though a conveyance of 
“mines” may do so.57
Where mineral rights are owned separately, they do not necessarily entail 
rights to everything in the subsurface. The surface owner is not confined 
to the mere plane surface;58 rather, he or she is presumed to be entitled to 
possession of the land in all its respects below the soil, apart from whatever 
 53 G W Hinde, N R Campbell & P Twist, Principles	 of	 Real	Property	 Law (Wellington: 
LexisNexis, 2007) 6.002; B J Barton, Canadian	 Law	 of	 Mining (Calgary: Canadian 
Institute of Resources Law, 1993) 31.
 54 Wade	 v	 NSW	 Rutile	Mining	 Co (1969) 121 CLR 177, 185. There is a contrary view 
expressed by A J Bradbrook, “Ownership of Geothermal Resources” [1987] AMPLA 
Yearbook 353; A J Bradbrook, “The Relevance of the Cujus Est Solum Doctrine to the 
Surface Landowner’s Claim to Natural Resources Located Above and Beneath the Land” 
(1988) 11 Adel L R 462; and, following him, K Gray and S F Gray, Elements	of	Land	Law, 
3rd ed (London: Butterworths, 2001) 21. However, his view that cuius	est	solum may not 
apply below 200 metres is not supported by authority.
 55 North	British	Railway	Co	v	Budhill	Coal	and	Sandstone	Co [1910] AC 116 (HL Scot).
 56 See B J Barton, Canadian	Law	of	Mining, supra note 53, at 34. A Canadian case that is 
often cited in this respect is Little	v	Western	Transfer	and	Storage	Co [1922] 3 WWR 356 
(Alta SC TD). See Bankes, Poschwatta & Shier, supra note 36, at 604, referring to the 
“English” rule and the “American” rule. Little, in their view, is understood to require the 
consent of the mineral owner to use pore space.
 57 Mitchell	v	Mosley [1914] 1 Ch 438 (CA) at 450; Halsbury’s	Laws	of	England, 4th ed, vol 
31, para 12.
 58 Pountney	v	Clayton (1883) 11 QBD 820, at 833, 839.
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mineral rights are vested in another. The default position is that the subsurface 
is in the same ownership as the surface, subject only to particular grants of 
mines and minerals. An interference with the landowner’s right to possession 
underground is therefore trespass, just as on the surface. In Austin	v	Rescon	
Construction	 (1984)	Ltd 59 a construction company inserted anchor rods 
under the neighbouring property for temporary support; exemplary damages 
were awarded against it to deprive it of the profits of its trespass. It was no 
defence that permission to enter was unreasonably withheld. Waugh	v	Attorney	
General 60 dealt with a tunnel that the Navy had used for many years, connecting 
two of its yards under some private properties. For the time that there was no 
authorisation in place, the tunnel was a trespass. Damages were measured by 
the Navy’s profit using the tunnel rather than a longer route through the streets. 
Damages did not need to be measured by the landowners’ loss.
In Western Canada, the private ownership of oil and gas rights is common, 
although by no means prevalent, so these matters of ownership are significant, 
most plainly in the case of a CCS operation that proposes to use a depleted 
oil and gas reservoir. Bankes, Poschwatta and Shier distinguish between 
cases where there is split title, that is, a division between owners of different 
mineral rights (different persons holding the rights to oil, gas, and coal for 
example), and cases where there is no such split.61 New Zealand has seen less 
petroleum activity than Alberta, and it has had a vesting of all rights to oil 
and gas in the Crown since 1937; so while the Albertan issues could arise in 
some circumstances in New Zealand, the manner in which they would is rather 
different. For example, questions of interpretation of freehold oil and gas leases 
do not arise. More comparable is their analysis of the disposal of CO2 into 
saline aquifers, because in Alberta, the Water Act declares the Crown to be 
the owner of all water including underground water. Finally, one notes that an 
Alberta statute declares that a sink right is a property right, in terms that include 
geological and biological sinks.62 It appears to be an assertion of provincial 
jurisdiction against the federal government.
In Australia, questions of ownership of storage capacity have not arisen 
in the debate about the new Commonwealth legislation, for the simple reason 
that it is for offshore areas, where there are no private property rights except 
possibly aboriginal title. The offshore situation in New Zealand is controlled 
by the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 which declares that the full legal and 
beneficial ownership of the public foreshore and seabed is vested in the Crown 
as its absolute property.63
 59 (1989) 57 DLR (4th) 591 (BC CA).
 60 [2006] 2 NZLR 812.
 61 Bankes, Poschwatta & Shier, supra note 36, at 606.
 62 Climate Change and Emissions Management Act, SA 2003 c C-16.7, s 9.
 63 Section 13. The Act goes on to establish procedures for the vindication of territorial 
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Onshore in Australia, ownership raises more complexity. Some substantial 
analysis of the issues has been carried out.64 A direct way of dealing with them 
was employed in Victoria, where the Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration 
Act 200865 declares:
(1) The Crown owns all underground geological storage formations below the 
surface of any land in Victoria.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in relation to any land (other than Crown 
land) to the extent that the underground geological storage formation is 
within 15.24 metres of the surface of the land.
(3) Subsection (1) applies despite any prior alienation of Crown land.
(4) The Crown is not liable to pay any compensation in respect of a loss caused 
by the operation of this section.
That assertion of Crown ownership is backed up by a prohibition of exploration 
or development of such formations without an authorisation under the Act. The 
Queensland Act is similar.66
It is clear that CCS legislation for New Zealand needs to address ownership 
if CCS onshore is to be possible. Whether it needs to make a claim of ownership 
in the style of Victoria or Queensland is less clear. Such declarations may leave 
more unanswered questions than their sweeping tone might suggest. What CCS 
operations need, in practical terms, is firstly authorisation, so that they are legal; 
and secondly, protection, so that no one else can interfere with the operations 
in the exercise of proprietary rights. If legislation can provide these two things, 
then much of the debate about property rights can be circumvented. Legislation 
in any form is likely to be scrutinised for the possibility that it causes a breach 
of the principles of the Treaty under the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, with a 
consequential claim to the Waitangi Tribunal. In 2003 the Tribunal found that 
the vesting of all petroleum in the Crown by the Petroleum Act 1937 caused 
such a breach,67 but the government did not accept this, maintaining that Maori 
and non-Maori owners of land had been treated equally.
claims and customary rights orders, but if made they are unlikely to affect rights to CCS 
formations.
 64 Minter Ellison, Carbon	Capture	and	Storage:	Report	to	the	Australian	Greenhouse	Office	
on	 Property	 Rights	 and	Associated	 Liability	 Issues (Canberra: Australian Greenhouse 
Office, 2005).
 65 No 61 of 2008, s 14. An underground geological storage formation is stated to include any 
seal or reservoir of an underground geological formation; and any associated geological 
attributes or features of an underground geological formation.
 66 Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld) s 27: all GHG storage reservoirs in land in the 
state are and are taken always to have been the property of the state.
 67 Waitangi Tribunal, Petroleum	Report (Wellington: Legislation Direct, 2003).
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4. TITLES OR PERMITS FOR CCS
The next issue is the set of titles (or rights, permits, or licences) that may 
be granted for carbon capture and storage operations. The new Australian 
Commonwealth legislation implements a carefully devised set of titles. 
Under Chapter 3 of the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 
2006, three main titles are available for CCS purposes, modelled on existing 
petroleum titles:68
GHG	titles	or	declaration	 Part	and	sections	 Comparable	petroleum		
	 	 title	or	declaration
GHG assessment permit Part 3.2 Petroleum exploration 
 ss 288–311 permit
Declaration of identified GHG Part 3.2 Declaration of petroleum 
storage formation  ss 312–317 location
GHG holding lease Part 3.3 Petroleum retention 
 ss 318–354 licence
GHG injection licence Part 3.4 Petroleum production 
 ss 355–373 licence
The first step in obtaining GHG titles is the release of acreage by the Crown 
for bidding for GHG purposes through a “work bid” or a “cash bid” process. 
The Minister has a wide discretion in the release of acreage. The matters that 
the Minister may take into account in evaluating bids are set out in the Act and 
in criteria to be disclosed by the Minister. Once obtained, the GHG assessment 
permit allows the holder to explore for storage formations and injection sites. Its 
term is 6 years, with one renewal for 3 years. The holder of a GHG assessment 
permit (or the holder of a petroleum retention licence or production licence) 
may apply for a declaration of an “identified greenhouse gas storage formation”. 
A substantial work programme is likely to be required, including modelling of 
potential migration paths of stored gases. The declaration lasts for the life of 
the project: s 312 et seq. The holder of a permit under a declaration can apply 
for a GHG holding lease, if a GHG source will not be available within 5 years 
but will be within 15 years, and is entitled to the grant of one if its application 
is in order: s 325. Its term is 5 years with one right of renewal: ss 322 and 
347. Alternatively, if the holder of a permit under a declaration is ready to 
commence injection operations within 5 years, it can obtain a GHG injection 
licence, subject to satisfying an elaborate set of criteria and a public interest 
test: s 361. An injection licence authorises the injection and permanent storage 
of GHGs in identified storage formations, subject to a number of requirements, 
 68 This account follows M Gibbs, “Greenhouse Gas Storage in Offshore Waters: Balancing 
Competing Interests”, supra note 47.
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including a site plan and a site closing work programme.69 It remains in force 
indefinitely until a site closing certificate is issued by the Minister, and in this 
respect connects with provisions, discussed below, for liability.
Onshore state legislation is similar. Queensland’s Greenhouse Gas Storage 
Act 2009 provides for competitive tendering for a GHG exploration permit, 
renewals, application for a potential storage area, and a GHG injection and 
storage lease, either on the basis of a permit or by competitive tender. In 
Victoria, the Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 provides for 
exploration permits, retention leases, and injection and monitoring licences.
A formal system of allocation of rights to CCS formations is necessary in 
order to accommodate the different stages of the CCS process, and to balance 
the competing interests. Bankes and Poschwatta identify the desirable features 
of a system of allocation of title to CCS formations.70 There is a strong case for 
a formal system of allocation that provides security of tenure for CCS operators, 
that recognises the value of reservoir formations as a public resource, and that 
makes such formations available on transparent and competitive terms. This 
implies nomination of lands for CCS purposes after review of public interests 
such as environmental suitability, offers of land in a bidding system, work 
requirements, and release of acreage and deep rights that are not being pursued. 
In addition, there is a clear need for different titles for the different stages of 
exploration, assessment and exploitation of CCS formations; at an early stage 
of exploration a company is not able to provide all the details and assurances 
necessary to permit injection operations to begin. In this, CCS is similar to the 
sequence of oil and gas or hardrock mineral activities from reconnaissance to 
production and rehabilitation. All such natural resources require a systematic 
framework for the allocation of rights.
In contrast to the elaborate Australian frameworks, the closest parallel to 
CO2 disposal in Alberta is the “letter of consent” system which has evolved 
for acid gas disposal operations, under the oversight of the Alberta Energy and 
Utilities Board, now the Energy Resources Conservation Board (“ERCB”).71 
It is informal in ways that stand in contrast not only to the Australian CCS 
legislation, but also to Alberta’s own legislation for the disposition of oil and gas 
rights. It is deficient in respect of openness, publicity, charges and returns to the 
public, indemnification for loss to the public, term, and assignment.
 69 Gibbs, ibid, at 65.
 70 Bankes & Poschwatta, supra note 40, at 64–70.
 71 Mines and Minerals Act RSA 2000, c M-17, Energy and Utilities Board, Directive 065: 
Resources Applications for Conventional Oil and Gas Reservoirs, revised 3 July 2007. 
See Bankes, Poschwatta & Shier, supra note 36, at 603. The ERCB was reconstituted on 1 
January 2008, and replaces the EUB as regulator of oil and gas and other mineral resources 
activities.
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5. RELATIONSHIP WITH OIL AND GAS OPERATIONS
Carbon capture and storage operations may often take place close to oil and 
gas operations, especially if the target storage formation is a depleted oil or 
gas reservoir. One main issue is that the CO2 that is injected in CCS operations 
can migrate into adjoining formations, so as to damage petroleum resources, 
making petroleum production more difficult. The other main issue is that CCS 
storage formations can be compromised by oil and gas wells, both old ones and 
new. Where the plugging and abandonment of a well has not been adequate, 
a CO2 leak is possible. Carbon dioxide is corrosive; with water it forms acid 
which can attack steel and cement, although the cements being used are more 
resistant to attack than hitherto. Petroleum companies can worry about new 
restrictions on their operations, about being shut out of acreage that is set aside 
for CCS, and about being pressed to make room on offshore installations for 
CCS operators. Conflicts between resource users are not unprecedented — for 
example, in respect of surface rights or navigation and fishing; or between coal 
and coal seam methane.
In Australia, the conflict between petroleum and CCS operations was one of 
the most controversial issues in the passage of the OPGGSA in 2008. Opponents 
argued that the Bill gave undue preference to the holders of petroleum tenements 
(licences) in a way that could allow the petroleum industry to inhibit the growth 
of a CCS industry. A number of changes were made in response, to give the 
petroleum industry protection but not a general veto.72 The result in the Act is a 
set of very intricate provisions to balance the different interests. Meredith Gibbs 
has analysed them carefully,73 and only the main features are noted here. The 
most basic feature of the OPGGSA’s balancing is to draw a distinction between 
petroleum titles where the title (or its predecessor) was in existence before the 
new law came into effect on 22 November 2008, and those that arose under the 
new rules. “Pre-commencement” petroleum titles are protected by a number of 
restrictions on GHG (greenhouse gas, or CCS) operations. The Minister has a 
wide discretion to impose conditions on GHG titles. Any “key GHG operation” 
requires the consent of the Minister, to be exercised taking into account present 
or future petroleum activities. Where GHG operations pose a “significant risk 
of a significant adverse impact” (a “SRSAI”) on petroleum operations he or 
she must take into account the existence of any agreement with the petroleum 
operators. (The meaning of “adverse impact” was tightened up in the legislative 
process.) In certain circumstances, the petroleum operator has a power of veto 
where there is a SRSAI. In other cases the Minister must balance the competing 
 72 Barrymore & Mathison (2008), supra note 45; Fahey & McMurtrie (2008), supra note 45; 
Barrymore & Mathison (2006), supra note 46.
 73 Gibbs, supra note 47.
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concerns in a public interest test. The petroleum title holder has preferential 
rights to GHG titles in certain circumstances. After the issue of a GHG title, 
the Minister retains a power to make directions to its holder where the GHG 
activities pose a SRSAI on petroleum operations.
The OPGGSA provides a much more level playing field in respect of “post-
commencement” petroleum titles. Where there is overlap, GHG (i.e. CCS) 
operators will continue to be restricted in a number of ways, but petroleum 
operators will be subject to similar restrictions in respect of their own activity. 
There is no automatic priority for either industry. The Minister employs 
a “public interest” test more often. The Minister can use a policy of spatial 
separation to keep petroleum and GHG operations out of each other’s way, and 
in making the key decision about opening acreage up for bidding, he or she 
must now consider GHG issues as well as petroleum.
Broader policy issues can be discerned within these intricate OPGGSA 
provisions. While the petroleum industry of Australia has reason to feel satisfied 
with the security of tenure that it obtained for its holdings, it comes at the cost 
of reduced security of tenure for the new GHG titles, which may make the 
investment climate for CCS less attractive — an outcome that is at odds with a 
policy preference of stimulating the development of a CCS storage industry.74 
Less easy to see is whether these provisions will allow CCS to emerge as an 
independent industry, or to emerge as an offshoot of the petroleum industry. The 
petroleum industry could be tempted to see itself as the sole proprietor of CCS, 
holding the expertise and holding much of the relevant acreage, and providing 
new services to utility companies and coal companies. As a matter of public 
policy, legislators will need to work carefully to find an industry structure that 
will not discourage the introduction of CCS.
Scott Singleton and Ryan Gawrych have analysed state legislation on 
overlapping interests.75 They describe the Commonwealth model as giving 
absolute primacy to pre-commencement petroleum titles in the face of a 
SRSAI, but Queensland as conferring significant discretion on the Minister 
in determining grants. South Australia has required GHG grant applications 
to pass a compatibility test, but Victoria has made no provision at all for 
restrictions on grants in overlap situations. All three states have followed 
the Commonwealth’s example of post-grant powers to restrict activities that 
may affect other resource entitlements. Victoria relies strongly on this aspect, 
but South Australia much less. The public interest plays a key role in each 
jurisdiction, although only Queensland and Victoria have elaborated it. Each 
jurisdiction also restricts future petroleum operators in respect of what would 
 74 Gibbs, ibid, at 75.
 75 S Singleton and R Gawrych, “Overlapping Land Interest Issues for GHG Grants and 
Activities”, Paper presented at AMPLA National Conference, Sydney, 28–31 October 2009. 
The paper includes a useful tabular analysis of the OPGGSA and three state Acts.
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otherwise be GHG activities, and each allows for the Minister to intervene in 
the event of one resource user having an impact on another.
6. REGULATION
Regulation can be distinguished from the allocation of titles in that it involves 
the granting of permission but nothing of a proprietary character. It is more 
fine-grained, examining particular operational proposals, and checking them 
for purposes such as safety and the conservation of natural resources. Alberta 
has an oil and gas regulatory framework that over the years has become very 
sophisticated, but is unadapted for carbon capture and storage. Australia has a 
new system specifically for CCS. New Zealand, by comparison, has a long way 
to go even in relation to conventional petroleum operations.
The regulation of petroleum operations in Alberta is within the jurisdiction 
of the Energy and Resources Conservation Board, under the Oil and Gas 
Conservation Act (“OGCA”),76 the Energy Resources Conservation Act,77 and 
a number of other statutes. Generally, regulation by the ERCB is kept quite 
separate from ownership and the granting of dispositions by the provincial 
Department of Energy, like petroleum and natural gas licences, so that all 
oil and gas operations, including those respecting privately owned minerals, 
are covered. The principal instrument of the ERCB’s regulation of the oil and 
gas industry is the approval process for well licences under the OGCA.78 A 
company may not drill a well without a licence under the OGCA, even if it holds 
a petroleum and natural gas licence. A range of other provisions provide for 
control over the waste of oil and gas, well spacing, plugging and abandonment 
(“P&A”), and other aspects of oil and gas operations. These provisions are 
general enough to include CCS, but poorly adapted. The closest analogies to 
CCS in the present regulations are the provisions for enhanced oil recovery and 
acid gas disposal (“AGD”).
Under s 39 of the OGCA, no person may commence a scheme for enhanced 
recovery (enhanced oil recovery or EOR) or for the storage or disposal of any 
fluid to an underground formation through a well, without the approval of 
the ERCB. This prohibition is broad enough to include CO2 injected for CCS 
purposes.79 An application is referred to the Minister of the Environment, and 
any Board approval is subject to the conditions imposed by that Minister unless 
 76 RSA 2000, c O-6.
 77 RSA 2000, c E-10.
 78 Canada	Energy	Law	Service (Thomson Carswell) § 176.
 79 Bankes, Poschwatta & Shier, supra note 36, at 611. The description of the Alberta regulatory 
regime in the following paragraphs relies upon that article.
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Cabinet orders otherwise.80 The OGCA and its subordinate Regulations and 
Directives classify wells for the injection of CO2 or other gases used in EOR 
or disposal or storage as a Class III well, for increased levels of monitoring, 
surveillance, and higher standards on completion for cementing and casing, 
logging to show hydraulic isolation, operating parameters, and other tests. 
These extra requirements are aimed at the presence of hydrogen sulphide, so 
they should be adequate for the less toxic CO2. Applications must be notified 
to persons with subsurface interests that may be affected. Interestingly, few 
applications for either EOR projects or AGD projects have triggered a 
public hearing or produced formal reasons for decision. In one case, Alberta 
Environment took part in the hearing as a “friend of the Board” in order to 
explain water resources matters and the question of hydraulic connection. The 
Board decided that there was no link between withdrawals of water for the EOR 
scheme and the changes observed by the intervenors.81
The abandonment of oil and gas wells, including wells for EOR and AGD 
operations, is controlled by the ERCB, so as to leave downhole and subsurface 
structures in a permanently safe and stable condition, and in particular to cover, 
with cement, all non-saline ground water and to isolate or cover all porous 
zones.82 Completion reports and plug logs must be submitted to the ERCB. 
Much of this regulatory scheme can be applied directly to the abandonment 
phase of a CCS project, with one exception: it does not provide for ongoing 
monitoring and verification of the well after abandonment.83 This monitoring 
and verification, over a long period, is expected to be an important aspect of 
CCS projects.
The regulation of EOR projects is aimed at optimisation of hydrocarbon 
recovery, safety, protection of the environment, and equitable treatment of other 
well licensees.84 EOR projects have a similar geographical scale to likely CCS 
projects, which makes them a useful analogy in terms of regulation, but on the 
other hand their objectives are very different: the injection of CO2 is merely 
a means to the end of increased hydrocarbon recovery. In fact, the Directive 
covering the conservation of gases produced from an EOR scheme allows inert 
gases such as nitrogen and carbon dioxide to be vented to the atmosphere.85 That 
is not exactly the point of a CCS scheme.
 80 OGCA s 39(4).
 81 Case Resources Inc Enhanced Oil Recovery Scheme, Oil Well, Effluent Pipeline and Water 
Pipelines, Carrot Creek Field, EUB Decision 2002-032, 21 March 2002.
 82 ERCB/EUB Directive 020: Well Abandonment Guide. Surface land reclamation is dealt 
with by Alberta Environment.
 83 Bankes, Poschwatta & Shier, supra note 36, at 618.
 84 ERCB Directive 065, s 2.1.2.
 85 ERCB/EUB Directive 060, Upstream Petroleum Industry Flaring, Incinerating, and 
Venting, s 8.5.
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AGD schemes are similar to CCS in that they are concerned with permanent 
disposal, and are therefore a good analogy, although they are much smaller; CCS 
schemes will probably be 10 or 100 times the size of current acid gas operations. 
ERCB scrutiny focuses on several matters for which useful comparisons with 
the regulation of CCS can be made, including equity in respect of other mineral 
rights owners, and safety in respect of above-ground releases. (Where public 
hearings have taken place, the main safety issue to be raised is the potential for 
flaring, and therefore acid gas emissions, in the event that the injection facility is 
shut down for any reason.)86 In respect of containment, reservoir characteristics 
and hydraulic isolation, the ERCB requires a great deal of information to 
demonstrate that the injected fluids will be contained “within a defined area and 
geologic horizon, to ensure that there [will be] no migration to hydrocarbon-
bearing zones or groundwaters”.87 However, this emphasis on structural trapping 
is less suitable for injection into a saline aquifer, and the plume spread and 
migration characteristic of CCS injection into such formations will need to be 
addressed more explicitly. Indeed, that last point brings one to the general theme 
of Bankes, Poschwatta and Shier’s analysis of the Alberta regulatory regime. 
While the injection of CO2 is controlled by the ERCB at present, the regulation 
needs considerable amendment in order to deal properly and explicitly with 
CCS.88
In the new Australian OPGGSA there are numerous regulatory controls 
along with the provisions for allocation of titles that we considered earlier. 
Geological formations are classified as potential, eligible, or (after a declaration 
as above) identified.89 The site plan is an important regulatory instrument for a 
particular site.90 “Key greenhouse gas operations” require the approval of the 
Minister at the stage of the GHG assessment permit or GHG holding lease. The 
range of operations defined as “key” is very wide. The Minister may take into 
account general matters in relation to the public interest but also a variety of 
possible effects on petroleum operations.91 “Serious situations” authorise the 
regulator to use emergency powers.92 The site closing certificate, as described 
above, is another means of detailed regulatory control.
When one turns to New Zealand, it is striking how little regulation there 
is of petroleum activities in this sense under the Crown Minerals Act 1991. 
There is no obligation to submit plans and obtain approval before beginning 
 86 Bankes, Poschwatta & Shier, supra note 36, at 615.
 87 ERCB/EUB Directive 065, s 4.2.2.
 88 Bankes, Poschwatta & Shier, supra note 36, at 616, 619. Bankes & Poschwatta, supra note 
40, at 71 develop that analysis in a detailed comparison with the Australian OPGGSA.
 89 Sections 20, 21 & 312.
 90 OPGGSA s 457.
 91 OPGGSA ss 7, 27, 292, 321 & 749(2)(b).
 92 OPGGSA s 379.
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drilling. The closest is that the operator must notify Crown Minerals of its 
intention to drill a well in its permit area.93 This contrasts with the obligation in 
Alberta to obtain a well licence from the ERCB. There is no obligation to plug 
and abandon a well. (Plugging and abandonment or “P&A” are the operations 
required to leave a well safe, without any risk of pressure blowouts, or migration 
of fluids from one stratum to another — for example, from a saline aquifer into 
a potable water aquifer.) The closest is an obligation to send an abandonment 
report to Crown Minerals not later than 120 days after the well is abandoned, 
stating the positions of “any” cement plugs or bridge plugs, along with details 
of any casing, tubing or downhole equipment recovered, and details of any items 
left in the well.94 This is insufficient. One has little confidence in the catch-
all requirement that “All well-drilling operations carried out under a permit 
must be carried out in accordance with recognised good exploration and mining 
practice”.95 The obligation to plug and abandon should be imposed by statute. 
Evidence in a case described by David Coull shows that while the obligation 
is usually imposed as a permit condition in the case of mining permits, it has 
never been imposed in the case of exploration permits.96 There are thought to be 
twenty or thirty “orphan” wells, suspended without plugging and abandonment 
obligations attached. Who knows how many other wells have been abandoned 
without compliance with P&A obligations where they were attached.97 This 
is unsatisfactory in general terms, and as a matter of protecting the integrity 
of reservoir formations that may one day be vital for CCS, it seems to be a 
serious mistake. The obligation to plug and abandon should be accompanied by 
ancillary duties to satisfy the regulator that the obligation has been performed, 
to provide further information, and to carry out such further works as the 
regulator requires.
Some general observations can be made about the comparison of regulatory 
regimes. First, that of Alberta is much more complex than that of New Zealand. 
This is not surprising; New Zealand’s industry and number of wells is far 
smaller than Alberta’s. More than 350,000 wells have been drilled in Alberta, 
 93 Crown Minerals (Petroleum) Regulations 2007, SR 2007/138, reg 32.
 94 Ibid, reg 47.
 95 Ibid, reg 35.
 96 D Coull, “Cross-Boundary Mining and Exploration in New Zealand: The Implications 
of Greymouth	 v	Todd ” [2006] AMPLA Yearbook 497. See the Minerals Programme for 
Petroleum 2005, para 5.6.24, which says that mining permits (for petroleum production) 
will be subject to a condition requiring the proper decommissioning of production facilities 
and the permanent abandonment of wells.
 97 A regional council could have jurisdiction over such matters under the Resource 
Management Act 1991, but there has been no substantial effort to exercise it. Taranaki 
Regional Council, in its Regional Plan, makes the drilling of oil and gas wells a permitted 
activity if they are cased, and comply with one or two other minor stipulations.
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and a mere 773 in New Zealand.98 However, we should not allow the simple 
fact of the size difference to mask the fact that oil and gas exploration and 
development are complex, and need detailed regulation. Nor should we let the 
size difference excuse deficiencies in the New Zealand regulatory regime for 
oil and gas, even before one gets to CCS projects. Secondly, one notes how 
completely Alberta law keeps disposition of tenures — ownership — separate 
from regulation. This happens less in New Zealand. Thirdly, so far the Alberta 
regulatory regime has not come to grips with CCS at all. In a mature petroleum 
province with a number of stationary CO2 sources and a political commitment 
to push forward with CCS, this is striking.
7. LIABILITY
Liability often looms large in debate about climate capture and storage law 
reform, but the term is a very general one. There is civil liability, primarily 
negligence and nuisance in tort law, but also trespass and occupiers’ liability;99 
criminal liability for acts or omissions that cause serious harm to others; 
environmental liability for pollution and failure to comply with the requirements 
of the regulatory scheme; and liability for GHG emissions beyond what is 
allowed by the relevant emissions trading scheme or other regulatory system. In 
any such situation, liability breaks down into general liability — for example, 
to pay money damages, and remedial liability, in putting the matter right.100 A 
further perspective on liability or responsibility is the different stages of the 
CCS process at which it may arise. Any analysis of civil liability is complicated 
by the question of limitation periods and in particular whether the period runs 
from the date of an act causing damage, from the date when the damage is 
or could reasonably be discovered, or from the date when the actual loss is 
sustained.101
 98 D Hawkins and S Bachu, “Deployment of Large-Scale CO2 Geological Storage: Do 
We Know Enough to Start Now?”, Paper presented to 8th International Conference on 
Greenhouse Gas Control Technologies, Trondheim, Norway, 2006, at <www.events.adm.
ntnu.no>; see Bankes, Poschwatta & Shier, supra note 36, at 597. For New Zealand, to the 
end of 2007, a total of 773 wells are recorded as having been drilled: McDouall Stuart, 
“Riches for the Want of $ — Exploration in NZ”, 2003 (617 wells to end 2002); and 
Ministry of Economic Development, Energy	Data	File, June 2008, Table H.1 (156 in years 
2003–2007).
 99 It may be observed generally that the ownership or possession of land in itself rarely results 
in liability; some act or defined omission causing harm is generally required.
 100 See Bankes, Poschwatta & Shier, supra note 36, at 621 on this aspect.
 101 G P Campbell, “Carbon Capture and Storage: Legislative Approaches to Liability — 
Managing Long Term Obligations and Liabilities”, Paper presented at AMPLA National 
Conference, Sydney, 28–31 October 2009. On the commercially important questions of 
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The most controversial question in CCS law-making has been whether, 
after closure of a CCS operation, responsibility should be transferred from 
the operator to the state. The default position — unless the law is changed 
somehow — is that there is no such transfer, and the operator remains liable for 
negligence and otherwise. The EU Directive of 2009, building on some years of 
policy work, provides for a transfer of responsibility to the competent authority 
for monitoring, corrective measures, and ETS liability, but only (i) after the 
elapse of a minimum of twenty years from closure; (ii) if all available evidence 
indicates that the stored CO2 will be completely and permanently contained; and 
(iii) on the making of a financial contribution for thirty years’ monitoring.102 But 
the transfer is heavily qualified — for example, as to negligence.
In Australia, the initial policy position was that liability should be based 
on the existing rules of regulation and common law, but that the practical 
consequence of closure was that the government may assume responsibility in 
a manner that would minimise exposure to health, environmental, and financial 
risks for project operators, governments, and future generations.103 However, 
when the Bill was introduced in the Commonwealth Parliament in 2008 it said 
nothing about government liability. In the House of Representatives the relevant 
Committee recommended that there should be a transfer of long-term liability 
on strict conditions; but in the Senate the equivalent Committee recommended 
against a transfer; liability should stay with the company responsible. 
However, the Senate chose to follow the House of Representatives’ Committee 
recommendations. The government accepted this change in position, and the 
Bill was enacted with provisions for government liability.
On one side of this interesting debate are arguments against government 
liability. Industry regulation does not generally extend to excluding liability 
for negligence and other wrongs, and the legal framework for CCS should be 
no different from that applying to any other industry. We should not burden 
the taxpayer. We should not hand out special favours. “Polluter pays” is the 
relevant principle; the true costs of CCS should be internalised. We should not 
create a disincentive for the adequate management of stored GHGs. A claim 
by companies to be relieved of liability is inconsistent with their claim that the 
how risk of liability may be allocated between a sequestration company and CO2 suppliers, 
see Campbell ibid, and S Golding, “Some Considerations in Drafting Carbon Capture and 
Storage Contracts” (2009) 28 ARELJ 418.
 102 Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide, 23 April 2009, Arts 
18–20.
 103 Ministerial Council on Mineral and Petroleum Resources, Carbon	Dioxide	Capture	 and	
Geological	 Storage:	Australian	Regulatory	Guiding	Principles (2005) 46. I draw with 
thanks on an unpublished paper, C Kubs, “The Future of Long Term Liability for Carbon 
Capture and Storage in New Zealand: Stick to the Status Quo or Follow in Australia’s 
Footsteps?”, University of Waikato, 2009.
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risks to the community are small. Companies would only be liable if they fail 
to meet a duty of care.
On the other side of the debate, the main argument is that it is important, 
even urgent, for governments to foster this new industry. Foreseeability is not 
easy to establish while it is new. The existence of uncertain liability creates a 
poor investment climate and impedes commercial development. The lack of 
any track record makes it difficult to obtain insurance. Any problem with CCS 
injection is going to appear relatively soon, and the risk decreases quickly after 
the end of injection operations, so that a few years post-closure the residual 
risk to the government is very small. Practically speaking, we must accept that 
companies simply do not last forever, and there would be de facto inheritance 
of risk over time. Without a government assumption of liability, an injured party 
may be left without any existing party to sue.
It is an interesting question of legal policy. Can companies be induced 
to manage risk better by the threat of indistinct future liability, or by a set of 
specific near-term obligations as to closure? Useful comparisons could be made 
with similar questions in relation to minesite reclamation, nuclear industry 
insurance, and bank deposit guarantees.104
Under the OPGGSA as enacted, an application for a site closing certificate 
must include modelling and assessment of the behaviour of the injected 
GHGs.105 The applicant must carry out a decommissioning programme 
including plugging and abandonment of wells to prevent the escape of GHGs. 
The Minister may issue a pre-certificate notice which sets out the monitoring, 
measurement and verification requirements and the financial security that 
the applicant must post. The Minister may withhold a pre-certificate notice if 
injected GHGs are not behaving as predicted, of if there is a SRSAI on natural 
resources, the environment, or human health and safety. After a pre-certificate 
notice is issued and complied with, a site closing certificate is then issued. It 
remains in force indefinitely. Fifteen years or more after injection operations 
end, if injected GHGs are behaving as predicted, if the storage formation 
is stable, if there is no SRSAI, and if there has been no further injection of 
GHGs, then the Minister may declare the end of a closure assurance period. 
The effect is that from that point on, where the operator incurs any liability 
out of its operations, the Commonwealth will indemnify the operator, and the 
Commonwealth assumes liability where the operator has ceased to exist.106
The onshore Australian legislation may be noted briefly. In Queensland, 
injected GHGs become the property of the state after decommissioning, but 
 104 On minesites and oil spills, see Bankes, Poschwatta & Shier, supra note 36, at 625.
 105 Part 3.4, Div 7, ss 386–398.
 106 Sections 400–401. For a good general appraisal of the issues, see Minter Ellison, Carbon	
Capture	and	Storage, supra note 64; and R Campbell, “Long-Term Liability for Offshore 
Geosequestration” [2006] AMPLA Yearbook 515.
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the extent that liability is thereby transferred is unclear.107 In Victoria, risk 
must be evaluated before an authority is cancelled, and long-term monitoring 
and verification must be paid for, but there is no provision for liability or its 
transfer.108 In South Australia, common law liability is unaltered.109 There is no 
equivalent in these Acts of the OPGGSA indemnity.
In Canada, Bankes, Poschwatta and Shier consider that it is likely that losses 
suffered because of CCS projects in Alberta will be subject to the general law 
of torts in common law, as are losses at present from oil and gas operations.110 
There is no special scheme of liability for blowouts or other release events 
in Alberta, although there is one under the federal legislation governing the 
offshore and the north.111 However, the OGCA regime in Alberta does cover 
liability for the costs of remediation for proper abandonment, and for failure 
to comply with ERCB orders as to spills, blowouts, or similar incidents. An 
Orphan Fund is an important component of the regime. The Fund is financed 
by an industry levy, in order to meet the costs in cases of default in paying for 
the works to deal with such spills, blowouts, and the like. However, the Fund 
only covers the costs of control and remediation of a release, and does not cover 
liability for other harms it may cause. It is very arguable that the example of the 
present regime for oil and gas demonstrates that it is entirely possible to require 
the CCS industry itself to provide the additional security necessary to ensure 
that resources will be available to take remedial action in the event of a leak or 
release.112 One matter, however, that does require change is that a CCS operator 
be required to take an assignment of all licences for abandoned wells within its 
approval area, so that the CCS operator (and not the operator of the abandoned 
well) be liable for repressurisation of the formation.
8. RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER LEGISLATION
The last set of issues is a general one: the way that carbon capture and storage 
legislation would connect with other aspects of the legal system — other 
statutes in particular. Of those, the first is the climate change legislation. In the 
international sphere there has been a long debate, still unresolved, whether to 
 107 Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld) s 181. The section is entitled “Responsibility for 
injected GHG streams after decommissioning” but ownership does not generally impose 
liability.
 108 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic) ss 112, 174 et seq. Section 187 
deals with the occupiers’ liability of the holder of an authority.
 109 Petroleum Act 2000; and Campbell, supra note 106.
 110 Bankes, Poschwatta & Shier, supra note 36, at 620. They provide a useful appraisal of the 
ways that CCS operations could attract liability.
 111 Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act, RSC 1985, c O-7, s 26.
 112 Bankes, Poschwatta & Shier, supra note 36, at 624.
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accept CCS projects for credits under the Clean Development Mechanism.113 
Under national or sub-national legislation establishing emissions trading 
schemes, it needs to be decided whether CCS is a simple abatement, a reduction 
in emissions, or whether it is an offset, which would entitle the owner of the 
facility to offset credits. In the ETS of the European Union, it is an abatement. 
The advantage of it being an offset is that the ownership of storage can be 
treated differently from that of the sources. The generator of the source would 
not be liable, for example, in the event of any failure of permanence of the 
storage, unless contractually bound. Offsets also make it easier to deal with 
multiple generators feeding into the one storage.114
The new Australian Act, the OPGGSA, does not address the treatment of 
CCS in emissions trading. Australian law-making on emissions trading is under 
way. At the same time, one notes that New Zealand’s Climate Change Response 
Act 2002, with the major 2008 amendments establishing the emissions trading 
scheme, and with the alterations of 2009, makes little reference at all to CCS: 
s 168(1) authorises the making of regulations to prescribe the criteria for the 
type of carbon dioxide capture and storage for which a person may register 
under the Act as a participant. More will probably need to be done to produce 
a satisfactory interface.
The second set of relationships is with environmental regulation, chiefly in 
New Zealand the Resource Management Act 1991. As noted earlier, without 
law reform CCS operations require discharge permits under the RMA, and 
no doubt a number of other consents. A CCS regime of a kind could in theory 
be made the subject of a code nested within the RMA, under a national 
policy statement and national environmental standards, but it is unlikely to 
be satisfactory in practice. More likely to be an acceptable solution is CCS 
legislation outside the RMA, but with an interface that ensures that the RMA 
continues to control matters that properly belong under it. It may be possible 
for the CCS legislation to control subsurface operations that involve formations 
with no known hydraulic connection with surface features or with freshwater 
aquifers reasonably capable of surface use, in lieu of the RMA.
It is a serious concern that neither the RMA nor any equivalent extends 
beyond the twelve-mile limit, so as to be effective in New Zealand’s Exclusive 
 113 At its October 2009 meeting the CDM Executive Board, having had the matter under 
consideration since 2005, could only agree on presenting a summary of possible 
consequences: “Carbon dioxide capture and storage in geological formations as CDM 
project activities”, at <www.cdm.unfccc.int>. Also see P Martins Barata, “Carbon Capture 
and Storage in the Clean Development Mechanism: Overcoming the Stalemate” (2008), 
Think Piece, Centre for Law & the Environment Carbon Capture Legal Programme, at 
<www.ucl.ac.uk>.
 114 See an excellent explanation by L Chiam, “Abatements and Offsets: Legal Issues in 
Reducing Emissions and Developing Offset Projects” (2008) 27 ARELJ 105.
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Economic Zone (“EEZ”). It has been recognised for some time as a gap in the 
country’s environmental management system, but policy initiatives in the field 
have not been productive. The matter needs to be dealt with whether or not CCS 
projects in the EEZ are foreseeable.
A third set is in relation to surface rights — that is, the right to enter and 
use privately owned land. In Alberta, the Surface Rights Act,115 which has 
equivalents in the other prairie provinces of Canada, eliminates all rights of 
entry that a mineral owner holds as a matter of implication in a grant or as a 
matter of common law, and provides the means for a mineral operator to obtain 
either a surface rights agreement or a right of entry order from the Surface 
Rights Board. New Zealand’s equivalent, in the Crown Minerals Act 1991, 
is not so extensive, and is subject to the constraints, described above, on the 
operations that can be carried out under permits issued under it unless it is 
amended to facilitate CCS.
Finally, safety and third-party access to CCS facilities may need 
consideration. The uptake of CCS will be constrained if the owner of a facility 
such as a pipeline or an offshore platform can shut others out from using it. 
In New Zealand, there has only been light regulation of such situations.116 The 
Gas Act’s definition of “gas” begins with fuel, but it provides that it includes 
any gaseous substance that the Governor-General in Council declares by Order 
in Council to be a gas for the purposes of the Act. It is a nice question of 
interpretation whether CO2 could be the subject of such an order. If such an 
order can be made, and is, then the “co-regulation” of the Minister and the Gas 
Industry Company would apply. The safety regulation of the Gas Act would also 
apply. CO2 presents hazards if compressed, as does any gas under pressure, and 
if concentrated it can asphyxiate by excluding oxygen; but it is not inflammable 
like natural gas, and it is not poisonous like carbon monoxide or the hydrogen 
sulphide in sour gas. However, express legislation is more likely to be suitable 
to deal with both safety and third-party access.
9. CHARACTER OF THE LAW REQUIRED FOR  
CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE
Some of the characteristics of the law reform necessary for New Zealand 
become clear in the process of making these comparisons. Property rights 
issues can get complicated, but straightforward and equitable solutions should 
 115 RSA 2000, c S-24. Bankes, Poschwatta & Shier, supra note 36, at 610 conclude that it is 
wide enough to authorise the injection of CO2 for CCS purposes.
 116 B J Barton, “Self-Regulation, State Regulation, and Co-regulation in Energy in New 
Zealand”, in B Barton, L Barrera-Hernández, A Lucas and A Rønne (eds), Regulating	
Energy	and	Natural	Resources (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 137.
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be within reach. Long-term liability is a matter that involves policy choices 
that will probably be contested, but careful legislative design offers a range of 
solutions. A system of titles or permits akin to that under minerals or petroleum 
legislation is probably necessary. A regulatory framework will have to be 
designed to accompany it. Deficiencies in existing regulation for the exclusive 
economic zone, and for plugging and abandonment of wells, need not wait for 
CCS legislation for the remedy that they so clearly need.
One key question is whether the CCS legislation should be part of the 
petroleum legislation, under the Crown Minerals Act 1991, as it is in the 
federal Australian and South Australian legislation. There is certainly a case 
for building on existing legislation wherever possible.117 The institutional 
and technical capacity required for CCS is similar in most respects to what is 
required for petroleum, so the CMA, administered by Crown Minerals on behalf 
of the Minister of Energy, is suitable. The need to establish a proper balance 
between CCS and petroleum operations means that there would need to be a 
high degree of connection with the CMA if a stand-alone statute was chosen. 
Public policy in New Zealand is likely to reflect a need to accommodate the 
desire of the petroleum industry to protect its interests, without giving it a veto 
or monopoly on the emergent CCS industry.
The final question to ask about new CCS legislation is, big or small? The 
Australian federal legislation is at an extreme few would recommend, and has 
its own special reasons for being so elaborate. One is tempted by the thought 
that at an early stage of a new technology all that is needed is a one-section 
power in the Crown Minerals Act to authorise the Governor-General to approve 
a CCS scheme and all that it requires, notwithstanding any rule of law to the 
contrary. However, the analysis of the Alberta letter of consent procedure for 
injection exposes the risks of going to such an extreme — and that is in the 
context of an otherwise elaborate regulatory regime. Laws that are somewhat 
longer than the bare minimum are part of the price we pay for formality, clarity, 
and openness. Sweeping unconstrained discretionary powers do not promote 
the rule of law. One can see the reason in the recommendation of Bankes and 
Poschwatta to steer a middle course, for amendments to statutes for disposition 
of titles, with regulations to carry more detail.118 At the same time they make a 
credible case for legislation that gives flexibility, as do aspects of the Australian 
regime, to amend licences and consents in the light of new knowledge, and to 
accommodate adaptive management and “learning by doing”. CCS has barely 
begun to evolve.
The International Energy Agency takes a similar view. Its key message for 
 117 Bankes & Poschwatta, supra note 40, at 65, 77. The same choice, they note, has been made 
in the European Union.
 118 Ibid, at 71.
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the development of legal regimes for carbon capture and storage is that: “A 
number of national legal and regulatory issues merit attention; however, the 
near-term priority should be spurring additional demonstration projects.”119 
Delays in law-making should not impede demonstration projects, and we 
should not delay in providing basic legal frameworks for them, accepting that 
experience will cause them to be modified in due course. The need to get CCS 
under way is pressing, particularly in light of the number of coal-fired power 
stations being constructed internationally. Even if CCS is only to be a small part 
of the action we must take to stabilise the global climate, we must move to enact 
adequate legislation for it.
 119 International Energy Agency, Legal	Aspects	of	Storing	CO2 , supra note 41, at 9.
